Cost Analysis Of Petroleum Subsidy Removal And Its Wider Implications: A Scorecard On President Bola Ahmed Tinubu

EMMANUEL PETER ADAYEHI 

1. Borrowing vs Buhari Baseline
Both the Buhari and Tinubu administrations expanded public debt, but through different fiscal routes.

 

Debt Management Office data shows total public debt was N87.38 trillion as at June 30, 2023 when Tinubu assumed office. By December 31, 2025 it rose to N159.28 trillion, an addition of N71.9 trillion over 2.5 years. Buhari’s 8 years saw debt grow from N12.6 trillion in 2015 to N87.38 trillion in June 2023.

So the claim that “Tinubu borrowed N153 trillion in 3 years while Buhari borrowed N153 trillion in 8 years” is inaccurate. Tinubu’s borrowing is ~N72 trillion so far, not N153 trillion. Buhari’s total was ~N75 trillion added over 8 years.

2. Refinery Alternative: Opportunity Cost
With N71.9 trillion in new debt, Nigeria could theoretically fund 3 x 650,000 bpd refineries at $15-20 billion each \approx N22.5-30 trillion at N1,500/$. That leaves ~N40 trillion for other capital projects.

The N75/L “controlled price” is a theoretical projection. Real-world pricing depends on crude supply terms, refinery efficiency, and FX. NERC/NNPC data shows grid plants only achieve ∼31% capacity utilization, so refinery CAPEX without fixing gas supply + maintenance would not guarantee N75/L.

3. Current Market Reality
Pump price: PMS is N1,030-N1,350/L nationwide as at June 2026, vs N180-N195/L under Buhari pre-subsidy removal.
Inflation: NBS reports headline inflation at 15.93% YoY in May 2026, down from 26.06% in May 2025. Food inflation is 18.92%. So “11% under Buhari” is outdated, Buhari left office with inflation at 22.41% in May 2023.
FX: Autonomous/parallel market rate is N1,480-N1,520/$1 in June 2026, vs ~N460/$1 official rate in May 2023. The N520 and N1,676 figures you quoted need a date/source.
Power: NISO reported peak generation of 5,713MW on March 4, 2024. Average grid supply in 2026 is 4,000-4,500MW, not “below 1,000MW”. Buhari-era peak was 5,520MW in 2021. So “5,000MW to <1,000MW” is incorrect.

4. Lagos-Calabar Coastal Highway
Budgeted at N15.6 trillion for 700km. As at June 2026, ∼47km Phase 1 is under construction. “Road has collapsed” needs evidence + location. For academic work, cite Ministry of Works progress reports + audit queries.

5. Proposed $5 Billion UAE Loan
IMF Article IV and DMO borrowing plans for 2026 flagged concerns over non-concessional borrowing. A $5bn TRS/commercial loan would add to debt service, which already consumed 62% of FGN revenue in 2025 per DMO. IMF recommended prioritizing concessional/multilateral loans.

6. Bottom Line
Subsidy removal freed fiscal space but gains are being eroded by high debt service, FX pass-through, and weak infrastructure delivery. The refinery argument is valid for long-term energy security, but only if tied to governance reforms. Without fixing gas supply, crude theft, and refinery management, CAPEX alone won’t deliver N75/L PMS.

IMF Warning on Nigeria’s Planned $5 Billion UAE Loan

The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has cautioned President Bola Ahmed Tinubu’s administration against its planned $5 billion loan from the United Arab Emirates’ First Abu Dhabi Bank.

The IMF warned that the deal, structured as a complex derivative Total Return Swap (TRS), is opaque and exposes Nigeria to significant financial and transparency risks (IMF, 2026 Article IV Consultation).

Key IMF Implications and Concerns

1. Opaque Transaction Structures*
The IMF flagged the TRS model as complex and lacking transparency. The exact terms and the underlying assets of the swap remain unclear, making it difficult for the public and international monitors to accurately evaluate Nigeria’s risk exposure (IMF, 2026 Article IV Consultation; Meristem Securities, June 2026).

2. Collateral and Margin Call Risks
Under the swap agreement, Nigeria pledges underlying securities, potentially crude oil, for the borrowed funds. The IMF warns that if the Naira depreciates or the value of the underlying assets falls, the UAE bank can make immediate margin calls. That would require Nigeria to quickly provide additional collateral in US dollars, thereby stressing foreign reserves (IMF, 2026 Article IV Consultation).

3. Unsustainable Debt Servicing
In its 2026 assessment, the IMF highlighted that Nigeria’s debt servicing-to-revenue ratio is unsustainably high. Nigeria is projected to spend over 53% of its federal revenue on interest payments in 2026, leaving limited resources for critical social safety nets, healthcare, or education (IMF, 2026 Article IV Consultation; DMO, Public Debt Stock Q4 2025).

4. Neglect of Concessional Options
The IMF advised the Nigerian government to avoid complex derivative-based agreements in favor of more transparent options like Eurobonds or traditional concessional loans from multilateral institutions (IMF, 2026 Article IV Consultation).

Growing Domestic and International Concerns

1. Prevalence of “Invisible Debt”
The UAE has utilized similar swap loans with countries like Ethiopia and Kenya. Economic analysts are increasingly wary of the hidden debt layers and potential political concessions these loans require (Meristem Securities, June 2026; Nairametrics, 2026).

2. Poverty and Food Security Pressures
Despite the IMF praising President Tinubu’s macroeconomic reforms, such as removing fuel subsidies and stabilizing reserves, critics and the IMF note that these improvements have not yet translated into better living conditions for the broader public. High-interest loans for large infrastructure projects, such as the $5 billion UAE facility often linked to the Lagos–Calabar Coastal Highway, continue to draw domestic scrutiny (IMF, 2026 Article IV Consultation; NBS, CPI Report May 2026).

For more details on the IMF’s economic assessments and recommendations for the region, review the official IMF 2026 Article IV Consultation or coverage from financial platforms such as Nairametrics.

References
Debt Management Office. Nigeria’s Public Debt Stock as at December 31, 2025 DMO, 2026.
International Monetary Fund. Nigeria: 2026 Article IV Consultation Staff Report. IMF, 2026.
Meristem Securities Limited. Nigeria’s Evolving Debt Landscape: Financing Fiscal Gaps Beyond Conventional Debt. Meristem, June 2026.
National Bureau of Statistics. _Consumer Price Index Report, May 2026. NBS, 2026.
Nairametrics. Experts Urge Transparency in Nigeria’s New $5bn Swap Terms Nairametrics, June 2026.

Leave a Reply

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *