EMMANUEL PETER ADAYEHI

This paper analyzes President Bola Ahmed Tinubu’s administration from May 2023 to mid-2025, focusing on the removal of the fuel subsidy, economic reforms, anti-corruption efforts, and governance transparency. Utilizing data from the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS), the World Bank, and Transparency International, the study highlights the socio-economic impacts of these policies and evaluates public sentiment through media coverage and civic engagement indicators. Findings indicate a widening trust deficit, rising inflation, and increasing insecurity, revealing a disconnect between presidential policies and citizen welfare. The paper proposes prioritized policy recommendations to tackle urgent economic and governance challenges.
1. Preface
Bola Ahmed Tinubu assumed office on May 29, 2023, with a commitment to governance reform and economic improvement. His administration has faced significant criticism for the removal of the fuel subsidy, a decision that has drastically altered Nigeria’s economic landscape. This paper critically evaluates the effectiveness of Tinubu’s policies and their implications for the populace, with a focus on debt sustainability.
2. Research Design
– Data Sources: The analysis incorporates data from the NBS, World Bank, Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN), Transparency International, and surveys from civic organizations (Afrobarometer, ACLED, Nigeria Security Tracker).
– Time Frame: The evaluation spans from May 2023 to June 2025.
– Approach: A mixed-method methodology employs both quantitative analysis of economic indicators and qualitative assessments of governance and security.
– Survey Methodology: NOI Polls surveyed 1,200 respondents, with a margin of error of ±3%.
3. Key Policy: Fuel Subsidy Removal
3.1 Immediate Effects
The removal of the fuel subsidy on May 29, 2023, resulted in petrol prices soaring from ₦185/litre to over ₦600/litre, leading to a 150% increase in transportation costs within three months. Food inflation reached 40.5% by Q4 2023.
Table 1: Inflation Trends (2022–2025)
| Year | Headline Inflation (%) | Food Inflation (%) |
|——|————————|——————–|
| 2022 | 18.8 | 23.3 |
| 2023 | 28.9 | 40.5 |
| 2024 | 33.2 | 45.1 |
| 2025 (Q2) | 35.6 | 47.8 |
Source: National Bureau of Statistics, 2025; World Bank. DOI: [10.1596/9781464805567](https://doi.org/10.1596/9781464805567)
3.2 Economic Impact
– Naira Depreciation: The Naira’s value fell from ₦460/USD to ₦1,450/USD by June 2025.
– Unemployment Rate: Increased from 33.3% in 2023 to 40.8% by 2025.
– Poverty Rate: By 2025, approximately 63% of Nigerians lived on less than $2.15 per day (World Bank, 2025; DOI: [10.1596/9781464805567](https://doi.org/10.1596/9781464805567)).
3.3 Long-Term Debt Sustainability Implications
The removal of the fuel subsidy led to immediate inflationary pressures and rising unemployment exacerbate poverty, imposing a heavier reliance on public expenditure for social support programs.
A step by step analysis
1. The subsidy removal drove fuel price hikes, escalating costs impacting low-income households disproportionately.
2. Naira depreciation increased import costs, igniting a further inflationary spiral that undermines purchasing power.
3. Rising unemployment and inflation intensified poverty, deepening financial vulnerability for many Nigerians.
3.4 Counterarguments & Rebuttals
Yes subsidy removal could have corrected market distortions and promotes resource efficiency. However, the socio-economic ramifications necessitate that careful consideration of phasing out subsidies gradually, coupled with targeted cash transfers, could have alleviated negative impacts while preserving fiscal balance.
4. Governance and Transparency
4.1 Perceived Corruption
The Tinubu administration faces accusations of entrenched favoritism. The Corruption Perception Index ranked Nigeria 145 out of 180 in 2024, indicating a decline in governance quality.
4.2 Public Opinion
Surveys indicate 68% of Nigerians distrust governmental economic policies (NOI Polls, 2024), suggesting administrative actions have heightened financial struggles, contrary to pre-election commitments.
5. Security Challenges
The administration rising security threats, including banditry, Boko Haram violence, and farmer-herder conflicts contradicts pre-election promises.
Table 2: Security Incidents (2023–2025)
| Year | Banditry Attacks | Boko Haram/ISWAP Deaths | Kidnappings |
|——|——————|————————-|————-|
| 2023 | 1,200 | 1,742 | 2,800 |
| 2024 | 1,464 | 2,105 | 3,620 |
| 2025 (Q2) | 780 | 1,020 | 1,950 |
Source: Nigeria Security Tracker, 2025; ACLED. DOI: [10.53131/acled.1513](https://doi.org/10.53131/acled.1513)
6. Public Perception and Legitimacy
Governance under Tinubu appears disconnected from citizens’ realities. Key insights include:
1. Economic Burden: Ongoing hardships starkly contrast pre-election promises.
2. Public Frustration: Around 70% of citizens perceive a lack of clear governmental direction.
3. Youth Unrest: Over 60% of young people (ages 18–35) express dissatisfaction with administration policies.
7. Conclusion
The evaluation reveals that Tinubu’s anticipated reforms have not effectively materialized, risking exacerbation of Nigeria’s challenges. Future leadership must sequence citizen welfare through targeted policies addressing security and fostering sustainable economic reforms.
8. Policy Implications
The following recommendations could have helped to address immediate economic and governance issues:
Short-Term Actions
1. Three-Stage Cash Transfer Program: Allocate funds to the bottom 20% of households to mitigate the impact of subsidy removal. Critical given that 63% of Nigerians live on less than $2.15 per day (World Bank, 2025; DOI: [10.1596/9781464805567](https://doi.org/10.1596/9781464805567)).
Medium-Term Actions
2. Community-Policing Framework: Enhance local security while fostering citizen engagement in response to rising banditry.
3. Phased Subsidy Removal: Implement subsidy changes gradually, supported by robust monitoring systems to manage inflation and public dissent.
9. State-Level Revenue Data and National Fiscal Outcomes
Incorporating state-level revenue data would have enhance the understanding of Nigeria’s fiscal landscape under President Bola Ahmed Tinubu administration.The approach was never a consideration because the system under President Bola Ahmed Tinubu is maliciously marked in corruption and other related offenses.
Table 3: Estimated State-Level Revenue (2023–2025)
| State | 2023 Revenue (₦ billion) | 2024 Revenue (₦ billion) | 2025 Revenue (₦ billion) |
|—————|—————————|—————————|—————————|
| Lagos | 450 | 480 | 500 |
| Kano | 95 | 100 | 110 |
| Rivers | 180 | 190 | 200 |
| Oyo | 60 | 70 | 75 |
| Enugu | 35 | 40 | 45 |
| Kaduna | 70 | 75 | 80 |
| Overall Total | 890 | 955 | 1,000 |
Source: State Finance Commissions, Central Bank of Nigeria (estimates). DOI: [10.1016/j.jbusres.2023.01.048](https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbusres.2023.01.048)
10. Fiscal-Savings Transmission to Debt Service
10.1 Analysis of Fiscal-Savings Transmission
As Nigeria’s debt profile grows, understanding how fiscal reforms translate savings into reduced debt servicing is critical.
– Debt Sustainability: By mid-2025, debt servicing consumed approximately 96% of federal revenue, indicating a precarious fiscal condition. Sustainable revenue generation, supported by increased state revenues, is essential for reducing pressures on the national budget.
– Savings from Subsidy Removal: Redirecting 10% of savings from subsidy removal (approximately ₦3 trillion) toward debt repayment could reduce debt servicing by about ₦300 billion annually.
– Investment Potential: Allocating resources previously dedicated to debt servicing toward investments may spur economic growth and yield better fiscal outcomes over time.
11. Cost Analysis for Cash-Transfer Program
The proposed Three-Stage Cash Transfer Program seeks to buffer vulnerable populations against subsidy removal impacts.
Estimated Costs
1. Target Population: Approximately 20% of households (4.8 million based on 2023 census).
2. Monthly Transfer Amount: ₦10,000 per household.
3. Duration: 12 months.
Cost Calculation
– Monthly Cost:
\( 4,800,000 \text{ households} \times ₦10,000 = ₦48,000,000,000 \)
– Annual Cost:
\( ₦48,000,000,000 \times 12 = ₦576,000,000,000 \)
Sensitivity Analysis
To assess program viability, consider these scenarios:
1. Reduction in Target Population (15%):
– Cost: \( 3,600,000 \text{ households} \times ₦10,000 \times 12 = ₦432,000,000,000 \)
2. Increase in Monthly Transfer Amount (₦12,000):
– Cost:
\( 4,800,000 \times ₦12,000 \times 12 = ₦691,200,000,000 \)
3. Combination of Reduction (15%) & Increase in Amount (₦12,000):
– Cost:
\( 3,600,000 \times ₦12,000 \times 12 = ₦518,400,000,000 \)
These scenarios underscore the necessity for a comprehensive feasibility study prior to implementation.
Funding Sources
Ensuring the sustainability of the cash-transfer program could involve:
– Increased State Revenue Allocations: States with growing revenues, like Lagos, could significantly support this initiative.
– International Aid and Grants: Collaborating with NGOs and international partners could provide vital funding.
– Tax Reforms: Effective tax strategies can enhance revenue needed for social programs.
Final Observations
Understanding the interaction between state revenue trends and national fiscal outcomes is major for formulating effective economic policies. A well-structured cash-transfer program underpinned by sound fiscal principles can alleviate immediate economic distress and lay the groundwork for more extensive social safety nets, provided that sustainable funding mechanisms and equitable distribution are established.
